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I. INTRODUCTION
The two hypotheticals for this symposium concern a lawyer who
is asked to represent a married couple in which one spouse would like
to cede decision-making authority to the other. As we have examined
the lawyer's ethical responsibilities, we have identified two distinct, but
conceptually related, issues of legal ethics.' The first, a threshold
question, deals with the nature of marital representation: May a lawyer
simultaneously represent both husband and wife? And if so, how
should the representation be structured? The second adds an
additional layer of complexity: If a lawyer represents both husband
and wife, may the lawyer accept one spouse's delegation of decision-
* The authors are Associate Professors of Law at the George Washington University Law
School. We would like to thank the participants at a GW Faculty Workshop and Teresa Collett,
Peter Margulies, and Russell Pearce for their comments, as well as Aliza Milner for her research
assistance.
1. In this Essay, we use the phrases "professional obligation" and "moral obligation"
interchangeably. We focus here on the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. While we do not claim that the rules of professional ethics exhaust a lawyer's moral
duties in representing a client, the rules do provide useful guides for understanding the ethical
implications of a particular problem. We also recognize that professional rules are designed as
bases for disciplinary action by bar authorities, and we recognize that ethical dilemmas of the kind
discussed in this paper will rarely reach the level or type of misconduct that leads to professional
sanctions. However, despite their own protestations to the contrary (see MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope (1983)), the professional standards serve as touchstones for
determining other types of sanctions for attorney misconduct. See RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 14.4 (4th ed. 1996). For misconduct in the type
of cases discussed in this essay, professional malpractice liability is the most likely sanction. See,
e.g., Fickett v. Superior Ct., 558 P.2d 988 (Az. 1976) (attorney may be liable to a third party if
attorney knows or should have known guardian acting adverse to ward's interests). See generally
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who
Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994); Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary's Fiduciary:
Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889 (exploring closely analogous
cases, discussing implications for professional liability).
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making authority to the other within the representation? And if so,
what are the parameters of the delegation? 2
These questions are complicated because they ask us to deviate
from the typical structure of legal representation in which a lawyer (or
firm) represents one and only one person. In the "typical" representa-
tion, the lawyer zealously advances his client's interests, within the
bounds of law, and treats all others as strangers-as those who are at
least potential foes of the client. The lawyer sees only two kinds of
people: clients, to whom the lawyer owes duties of professional care
and loyalty; and nonclients, to whom the lawyer owes nothing more
than any one random person owes to another.' These questions are
complicated because they ask us to think about the similarities and
differences between commercial and marital relationships to determine
whether representation in both involves the same set of standards. We
believe that any representation involving multiple parties causes
problems for the typical account of representation and that marital
representation brings its own peculiar difficulties because of the
intimacy and dependency that characterize marriage.
Nonetheless, we believe that a lawyer may simultaneously
represent both husband and wife4 and that the lawyer can accept one
spouse's delegation of authority to the other. In such a situation,
however, we would require informed consent to the delegation at the
outset, and we would propose that the lawyer be obligated to revisit the
delegation in certain contexts. We would also establish four require-
ments that must define the context of delegation in marital representa-
tion where the same lawyer represents both spouses.
First, before a lawyer accepts such a delegation, she must ensure
that both spouses understand the powers that will be delegated and the
consequences of delegation. Second, the spouses must understand the
lawyer's duties within the relationship, including the lawyer's
2. The first hypothetical, involving Ruth and Bob, introduces a third element, religion, in
addition to the issues of marital representation and delegated decision-making that we deal with
in this paper. Though we understand that the reason for Ruth's delegation may be important to
her, and that the lawyer should be sensitive to a client's faith-based decision -making, we fail to
see how the religious nature of Ruth's judgment affects the lawyer's ultimate response. Spouses
elect to delegate authority to their mates for a wide variety of reasons, nearly all of them worthy
of the lawyer's respect.
3. See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
825, 825-30 (1992); see also Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy
and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV.
1103 (1992).
4. This Article focuses on married couples and, thus, generally refers to spouses as husbands
and wives. Our analysis applies, however, regardless of the sex of the spouses. See WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, TH CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996).
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obligation to consult with both spouses. Third, the spouses must
understand that the consent to delegation may be withdrawn. Finally,
the spouses must understand that the consent to delegation will be
revisited when the delegated spouse takes an action that may "substan-
tially harm" the delegating spouse.
In this Essay, we attempt to provide an explanation of why we
believe that marital representation involves special requirements and a
justification for the requirements that we have developed. In Section
II, we begin by examining various problems presented by multiple
representation. The third section briefly looks at the nature of
delegation in commercial relationships. The fourth section turns to a
discussion of the special character of the marital relationship; we try to
understand the nature of delegated authority within that relationship.
The last section uses a series of hypothetical questions to explore the
implications of our account.
II. MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
The law of lawyering tries to minimize any ethical problems that
might arise when a lawyer represents more than one client by
analogizing multiparty representations as closely as possible to the"unitary" model in two different settings. First, Model Rule 1.13,
"Organization as Client," allows the lawyer to represent an organiza-
tional entity-a single, fictive person. Consequently, the lawyer is not
required to negotiate between the diverse interested parties within
organizations (shareholders, directors, management, and other
employees).' Second, Model Rule 2.2, "Intermediary," allows the
lawyer to represent diverse parties whose unity comes from a shared
objective, such as the drafting of an agreement.6 As with corporate
entity representation, the lawyer represents the unity, not the individu-
al parties.
The Model Rules permit representation of multiple clients,
however, even when such representation fails to conform to the "one
lawyer for one client" ideal. As long as there is no conflict-no
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155 (tentative
draft Mar. 21, 1997). See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 1.13.102 (1998 Supplement).
6. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 2.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 211 (proposed Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996); John S. Dzienkowski,
Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession,
1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741.
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likelihood that the lawyer's representation of one party will materially
limit her representation of the other-the lawyer may represent
multiple parties simultaneously. 7  This is obviously true, since few
lawyers would survive financially if they represented only one client at
a time. The real issue, of course, is representing multiple parties in the
same matter. If there is no conflict, and none is likely to occur, the
lawyer may simply accept the multiple parties. Even if the parties
have conflicting interests in this matter, the lawyer may still represent
the parties if she assures herself that she can provide "independent
representation" to each, fully informs the parties of the nature of the
conflict, and gains their consent to continue the representation
notwithstanding the conflict.8 Under the Model Rules, few represen-
tations raise unwaivable conflicts; typically only those involving
simultaneous representation of adverse parties in litigation are
presumed unwaivable.'
The ethical analysis of multiple representation, then, usually turns
on questions of informed consent. Did the clients receive sufficient
information about the conflict? Was the clients' consent freely given?
Has the lawyer continued to provide the clients with information
relating to the conflict, especially where the information materially
changes the extent or nature of the conflict?"°
Marital representation tracks the general ethical analysis of
multiparty representation. Courts and bar associations have been
somewhat reluctant to permit joint representation of spouses in
divorce,1' though many jurisdictions do allow one lawyer to represent
both spouses in an uncontested divorce (assuming, of course, fully
informed consent). 2 In other contexts, such as a married couple's
7. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.7. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 201-202 (proposed Final Draft No. 1 March 29, 1996).
8. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.7(b).
9. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 5, §§ 1.7:206-207.
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 (proposed Final
Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996).
11. See Blum v. Blum, 477 A.2d 289 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); In re Breen, 552 A.2d 105
(NJ 1989). Oregon State Bar Ethics Op. 515 Uan. 1988) (found in ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS 1986-1990 901:7103) (regarding per
se conflict of interest); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 33 (1982) (found in ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS 1980-1985 801:2001);
New Hampshire Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 1986-7/2 (1986) (found in ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS 1986-1990 901:5702) (noting the very
limited possibility for joint representation in divorce).
12. See Klemm v. Super. Ct. of Fresno County, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
Perry v. Perry, 64 A.D.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). See also Colorado Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op.
68 (1985) (found in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS
1980-1985 801:1905); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 143 (1984) (found in
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purchase of a home, joint representation seems perfectly normal.
Indeed, one would hardly think of suggesting a different form of
representation where the spouses' interests are so closely aligned.
Between these two polar contexts of complete dissolution or perfect
harmony, a lawyer approached for representation by a married couple
has four options: a separate lawyer for each spouse, the same lawyer
representing each spouse individually, joint representation, and entity
representation.13
One possibility, of course, is that the lawyer can refuse simulta-
neous representation of spouses and request that one spouse, or both,
seek another lawyer. This possibility fits perfectly into the "one lawyer
for each client" ideal and may be appropriate where the spouses'
interests are in conflict (e.g., the spouses have a serious disagreement
about estate planning involving one spouse's children from a prior
marriage, or a man and woman who intend to marry want to execute
a prenuptial agreement). 14
Apart from such conflicts, the "separate attorneys" model leaves
much to be desired. Separate lawyers means additional expense for the
clients even though the additional protection is often unnecessary."
In addition, separate representation may actually be counterproductive.
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS 1980-1985
801:2312) (but see District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 243 (1991)) (found in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS 1991-1995
1001:2305).
13. Teresa Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One . . . Until the Lawyers are
Done, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101, 119 (1993) [hereinafter And the Two
Shall Become as One].
A fifth option would involve the lawyer representing one spouse, and the other spouse acting
pro se. While this model may be economically efficient, it may result in a set of additional
problems in which the unrepresented spouse does not understand the lawyer's role. Cf., Alysa
Christmas Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family Business: The Lawyer
as Intermediary, 73 IND. L.J. 567, 584-86 (1998); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line:
The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 79, 122-30 (1997).
14. Separate representation is not necessarily required for purposes of a prenuptial
agreement. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that "we have never held, nor are
we prepared to do so now, that an attorney should never represent both parties seeking an
antenuptial agreement." McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn. 1989). The
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act does not require separate representation. UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 371, 376 (1987).
15. Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, Comments and
Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and Wife, 28 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 765, 776-77 (1994) [hereinafter Special Study Committee].
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Dueling lawyers may convert an otherwise harmonious process into an
adversarial conflict.16
A second possibility is separate representation by the same lawyer
such that the same lawyer establishes two attorney-client relation-
ships--one with each spouse. The Special Study Committee of the
American Bar Association's Real Property Section accepts this model
as one alternative for marital representation, provided that the
relationship is established by express agreement of both spouses.17 In
contrast to separate representation by separate lawyers, the Committee
believes that separate representation by the same lawyer provides
greater coordination of the spouses' mutual interests--especially
important in estate planning-while still permitting each spouse the
advantages of "independent" advice and confidentiality. 8 However,
separate representation by the same lawyer presents serious conflicts of
interest that informed consent often cannot reliably cure. 9 Since it
would be extremely difficult even for the lawyer to describe the nature
of possible conflicts that might arise between the spouses, the spouses
will rarely be able to give sufficiently informed consent to this
representation.
Third, the lawyer could represent the spouses as joint clients.
Both the Special Study Committee and Professor Teresa Collett
approve of this model, but they seem to have quite different under-
standings of what the choice entails. For Professor Collett, joint
representation means that the clients share control of the representa-
tion, and the lawyer shares all confidences with both clients. Both of
these features distinguish the joint clients approach from separate
representation by the same lawyer. While separately represented
clients interact with the lawyer in isolation from each other, jointly
represented clients work in concert with the lawyer, promoting the
common development of their interests. The clients' isolation from
one another, and the lawyer's potential possession of confidences from
one spouse that are adverse to the other's interests, may lead the
separate representation model into unavoidable conflicts. The joint
16. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963,
982 (1987).
17. Special Study Committee, supra note 15, at 794-96.
18. Id. See also Jeffrey N. Pennell, Professional Responsibility: Reforms are Needed to
Accommodate Estate Planning and Family Counseling, 1991 U. MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN. 18-3,
18-29. The American College of Trust & Estate Counsel (ACTEC) also permit separate
simultaneous representation of husband and wife. See ACTEC Commentaries on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 88-89 (2d ed. 1995).
19. Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One, supra note 13, at 132-33.
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representation model, however, obviates these concerns through its
policy of full disclosure between the lawyer and client-spouses.
Because clients need to understand the risks involved in full disclo-
sure-that the lawyer must share all confidences with both clients,
regardless of the disclosing client's preferences-the lawyer needs to
obtain the spouses' informed consent before undertaking this form of
representation. 20
The Special Study Committee, on the other hand, sees joint
representation as the default model-the form spousal representation
takes in the absence of express consent by the parties.2 As the
parties have not consented, however, the mutual disclosure envisioned
by the joint representation model becomes problematic. 22  Full
sharing of confidences depends on prior notice to the joint clients.
Absent such notice, the lawyer should assume that "[m]ost confidences
would not be imparted if the client were mindful of the lawyer's
competing duty to the other spouse. "23 Thus, the lawyer often
should not disclose adverse consequences to the other spouse, but
instead withdraw from the joint representation if failure to disclose
would materially limit the lawyer's ability to represent both spouses.24
The Special Study Committee's strained analysis of disclosure may
simply reflect the potential ethical pitfalls in any marital representation,
but more likely it indicates the Committee's inadequate treatment of
the problem. If joint representation can raise troublesome conflicts
with respect to client confidences, then why not require the lawyer to
clarify the nature of the relationship, including the duty of full and
mutual disclosure, at the outset of the representation? 25
The fourth model, the family as an entity, differs from the other
approaches. Instead of representing the clients as individuals with
shared interests and objectives, the entity model returns us to a "single
client." This approach draws on the corporate client image of Model
20. Id. at 137-38.
21. Special Study Committee, supra note 15, at 778-79.
22. See the discussion of a similar concern in § 112 of the Restatement of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers. RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (proposed Final
Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996).
23. Special Study Committee, supra note 15, at 788.
24. Id. at 790-92.
25. See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Con-
flicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1289-90 (1994). Pearce characterizes
the Special Study Committee's approach as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": so long as neither client
discloses to the lawyer facts indicating the presence of a conflict, the lawyer has no obligation to
ask questions that might uncover a conflict. Id. at 1285-89.
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Rule 1.13, with the client as "the family unit. ' 26 The lawyer repre-
sents the parties in and through their unity as husband and wife. As
Professor Thomas Shaffer indicates, the entity model has the advantage
of reflecting many spouses' self-understanding, i.e., that "families are
prior to individuals. 27  The marital relationship constitutes the
spouses' identity in a way that other roles, such as being one among
several partners or shareholders, do not. Because the lawyer represents
and pursues the good of the family taken as a whole, the desires of
individual members may sometimes stand in tension with the group's
vision. Rather than taking such conflict as a reason for withdrawing
and abandoning the representation, the lawyer for the marital entity
has an obligation to seek a deeper reconciliation within the family.28
As Professor Collett recognizes, however, the entity approach
seems counterintuitive given both the paradigmatic form of entity
representation-the corporation-and our contemporary understanding
of marriage. 29  First, a lawyer representing a corporate client can
usually distinguish between the corporation as a legal person and the
corporation's constituents. A marriage or family may have its identity,
but, for reasons we will develop in the next section, this identity is
much more bound up with the individual identities of the spouses.
Second, and closely related to the first observation, a strong account of
marital unity may have been more plausible in an era of "entireties,"
of status relations rather than contract, when the family spoke and
acted as one invariably through the husband's voice alone.3" That
said, nothing prohibits the parties from adopting the entity model as
an alternative option for spousal representation, so long as it is
established by express agreement of the lawyer and clients. 1
26. Patricia M. Batt, Note, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical
Dilemmas Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 319, 338-41 (1992). We
are using "family" and "marital" interchangeably, even though we recognize that families often
include others than a husband and wife.
27. Shaffer, supra note 16, at 974. Shaffer develops his entity model through Model Rule
2.2 rather than Model Rule 1.13, but he intends the same end: that "the client is the family." Id.
at 976.
28. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 16, at 977-79 (pursuing deeper unity in the face of apparent
conflict). But see Batt, supra note 26, at 340 (majoritarian solution to conflict). Russell Pearce
also seems to be leaning toward a theory of entity representation, but his focus on exit as a readily
available option gives the relationship a very different cast than Shaffer or Batt. See Pearce, supra
note 25, at 1299-1300.
29. Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One, supra note 13.
30. Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1453 (1994). See also Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One, supra note 13, at 123-24.
31. Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One, supra note 13, at 124.
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The first two models, separate representation by separate lawyers
or by the same lawyer, provide some potential benefits, but they also
pose significant difficulties in operation-expense and disruption in the
former and unavoidable conflicts in the latter.32 In contrast, the third
and fourth models, joint and entity, seem to offer more constructive
options for marital representation, especially when one spouse seeks to
delegate decision-making authority to the other.33 Both these models
recognize the importance of marriage as a shared project, although to
differing degrees. Joint and entity representation respond to the
realities of most marriages, such as cooperative and collaborative estate
planning. Finally, assuming that mutual consent is required before
entering the representation, each model also recognizes that the spouses
are not totally subsumed within the marital relationship. 34
In this Essay, we ask whether consent provides sufficient
protection when one spouse has delegated his or her decision-making
authority to the other spouse. While the entity and joint clients
models provide useful starting points for our analysis of this issue, they
do not answer the difficult questions surrounding the delegation issue
in the context of marriage. For example, may the lawyer allow one
client, or the constituent of a client, to speak for or bind the other? Is
such a delegation limited by norms that protect the nonspeaking client,
or must the lawyer accept the speaking client's direction? If the
delegation is limited, where are these norms found? The next section
examines these difficult issues of delegation within the commercial
context.
III. DELEGATION
While the two hypotheticals suggest that delegation is unusual in
marital representation, it is certainly a normal feature in the ordinary
context of entity or joint representation in commercial relationships.3"
32. Especially when one spouse is delegating responsibility to the other, these models seem
inappropriate because there is no need for separate representation. Separate representation of the
wife would not provide her with any of the benefits offered by these two models.
33. Both the joint representation and the entity representation models offer a sufficient
structure within which the lawyer can afford the protections that this article contemplates.
34. Nor do we question the necessity of informed consent as a basis for entering into, and
for sustaining, an attorney-client relationship within the marital context.
It is not clear whether Professor Shaffer would recognize consent to the representation as a
necessary precondition, but his reliance on Model Rule 2.2 (even if it is a grudging reliance)
suggests that he would recognize such consent. See Shaffer, supra note 16, at 972-74.
35. As our analysis will suggest, we disagree with the hypotheticals' implicit assumption that
delegation is an unusual feature in marital representation. Few courts, bar committees, or
commentators may discuss delegated decision-making in this context, but we have no reason to
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The corporate client itself has no voice, so it must speak to its lawyer
through its agents.36 Likewise, in partnerships, the lawyer will often
take direction from one partner who is empowered to act in the name
of the others, even when the lawyer represents the partners individually
rather than the partnership as an entity.3 7 As we discuss below, the
law has developed useful mechanisms for structuring these commercial
relationships and protecting those made vulnerable by delegations of
authority. First, the fiduciary nature of the delegation provides its own
protections; second, the lawyer's professional obligations in represent-
ing these commercial relationships provide an additional layer of
protection.
A. The Nature of the Delegation
In form, delegation in the marital and commercial contexts appear
to be indistinguishable. One person, the principal, grants to another,
the agent, discretionary powers to act or decide matters on the
principal's behalf.38 Whether it is a limited partner's grant to the
general partner, a settlor's grant to a trustee (on behalf of a beneficia-
ry), or, as in Hypothetical II, Ruth's grant to her husband, all involve
discretionary entrustments. In form, the harm arising out of this
entrustment is also the same. By giving another the power to act in
her place, the principal accepts some risk of betrayal; this risk is
magnified, however, when the agent's power includes significant
discretion to make decisions based on his best judgment. When the
details of the agent's conduct cannot be specified in advance, i.e.,
reduced to contract terms, the law has traditionally turned to fiduciary
believe that spouses do not regularly entrust each other with this sort of authority in dealing with
an attorney or other agent.
In addition, by describing partnerships and corporations as "commercial," we do not mean
to imply that they cease to be fiduciary relationships. Within commercial delegations, the parties
do not operate at arm's length. However, it is still useful to contrast commercial and marital
delegations because the nature of the fiduciary relationships differ in significant ways. As we
describe below, the vulnerability accepted in both commercial and marital delegations can be
described as "instrumental," but the marital relationship also has a vulnerability that is intrinsic.
36. Under 1.13(e), the agents can be co-clients as well. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule
1.13(e).
37. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 5.7, 5.9 (1978).
38. Although Professor Collett does not share this assumption, we assume that the dele-
gating spouse would not participate actively in the attorney-client relationship. Thus, in the first
hypothetical, once the initial consultations established the form of the relationship (i.e., the
delegation), the lawyer would meet only with Bob, and Ruth would not participate or even be
present at these meetings. As we discuss in Section 4, we would allow the lawyer to contact Ruth
directly and would inform Ruth that she is free to contact the lawyer if she so desires.
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obligations to provide the relationship's structure. In broad outlines,
the agent owes the principal fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.39
The formal similarity between marital and commercial delegation
masks two distinctions between them relating to the justification for
and the scope of the delegation. In both marital and commercial
relationships, delegation of decision-making authority creates, or
exacerbates, the delegator's vulnerability to the delegatee. The specific
differences between marital and commercial delegation stem from
differences in the nature of this vulnerability. In a commercial
relationship, the vulnerability is limited by the scope of the commercial
enterprise and is justified by its instrumental value, i.e., its necessity
for achieving the goals of the enterprise. In a marital relationship;
however, the vulnerability comes from the spouses' intimacy and
mutual dependence. As such, vulnerability is intrinsic to the relation-
ship. In addition, spouses' vulnerability to one another is not bound
by any preordained scope of the relationship: it extends to the full
breadth of their shared lives. In this section we discuss the specific
character of vulnerability in commercial representation, and the
protections afforded by principles and rules of legal ethics. In the next
section we address the unlimited, constitutive vulnerability of the
marital relationship.
In a commercial relationship, the principal's entrustment is
instrumental. Because a principal lacks the time, resources, or
expertise to achieve her goals without the help of others, the principal
agrees to accede power over some aspect of her life to a fiduciary.
Thus, as I have neither the time nor the ability to study financial
information, I can entrust my stockbroker with care of my investments.
I can give her discretionary authority to buy or sell stocks on my
behalf based on her professional judgment. I trust her not to pick
stocks at random, and I trust her not to invest my money in her
husband's start-up business. My vulnerability to my broker is a risk
that I take in order to achieve other goals. The vulnerability is a
negative feature of the relationship; if I could eliminate the vulnerabili-
ty while retaining the benefits of the delegation-expert management
with little investment of my time-I would do so, but I cannot.
Along with its instrumental justification, delegation in the
commercial context is also distinguished by its limited nature. My
broker exercises authority over a small part of my life. She does not
39. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 882; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 829-32 (1983); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4-9 (1990).
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have the power to decide where my children will go to school, how my
salary will be spent, or where my family will vacation this summer.
A trustee may have wide-ranging authority to act in a beneficiary's
interest, such as buying, selling, and leasing property, or determining
the beneficiary's specific needs for trust funds. The trustee's powers
are, however, bound by the trust corpus. The trustee has no power to
deal with assets of the beneficiary that have not been placed in the
trust.40
Partnerships test this "limited" characterization, of course, because
partners will often have unlimited personal liability for partnership
debts. One partner's careless or disloyal acts may result in grave
personal financial injury to his fellow partners, including loss of their
homes and other family assets. It seems implausible to describe this
as a limited-purpose relationship. But partners' authority is limited:
partners' apparent authority to bind the partnership extends only to
acts in the ordinary course of the partnership's business. 41  For
example, absent unusual circumstances, a partner in a law firm could
not use the law firm's money to purchase an amusement park without
the other partners' consent.4 2  Nor could one partner mortgage
another partner's home.
Indeed, most nonfamilial fiduciary relations make sense to us only
because of their limited and instrumental character. We impose
relatively stringent burdens on fiduciaries, especially in the duty of
loyalty. At least traditionally, a trustee who loans himself trust funds
in order to make an investment is liable to the trust not only for the
monies borrowed from the trust, but also for any profits earned from
the investment.43 These almost altruistic obligations would seem
extreme apart from their limited contexts: we expect selflessness in
particular matters, not in general. Thus, a partner's duty of loyalty
extends no further than the partnership business.44
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1957).
41. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 301(1); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 37, at
§ 4.01.
42. However, a law partner could purchase law books without the firm's consent, and this
purchase would bind the partnership. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 37, at § 4.02(b)(3).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-06 (1959); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss
or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339,
1354-60 (1985).
44. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 37, at § 6.07(a). This is generally true, but
may be misleading. A partner's obligation extends beyond the partnership's existing business in
two important ways. First, a partner may not take advantage of a "partnership opportunity," e.g.,
by individually purchasing a piece of property while knowing that the property is needed for the
partnership's use, without first offering the opportunity to the partnership. See id. at § 6.07(d).
Second, and closely related to the partnership opportunity doctrine, is the partner's duty not to
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B. Protection in Representation
The protections offered by the fiduciary nature of commercial
delegations are reinforced by the lawyer's own professional responsibili-
ties in representing a fiduciary-delegatee. Through the mechanism of
informed consent, coupled with the background fiduciary structure of
the delegation, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct adequately
guide a lawyer who works within the limited, instrumental context of
commercial delegation. Three "moments" of consent frame the
lawyer's ethical role in representing the fiduciary delegatee.
The first moment of consent typically precedes the creation of the
attorney-client relationship. It occurs when the underlying commercial
relationship itself is formed. In addition to the fact that without the
consent to form the commercial venture the lawyer would have no
client, this first moment of consent is important because it establishes
the governance structure of the venture. The governance structure, in
turn, is especially important for our delegation question. The
governance structure, e.g., a partnership agreement, or corporate charter
and by-laws, determines the existence and scope of the authority of the
venture's agents or those who speak for the venture.
The second moment of consent occurs at the outset of the
attorney-client relationship. Of course, this consent must look back to
the first moment, when the identity and powers of the agent are fixed.
Unless the agent has the authority to bind the venture, no relationship
between the lawyer and the entity can be created.4" But once the
agent establishes her authority to form the attorney-client relationship,
the Model Rules step in to provide a default structure for the
relationship. By treating the client as the corporate entity, Rule 1.13
maintains a harmony between the lawyer and the (other) agents of the
corporation. All duties, the lawyer's and the other agents', run in the
same direction, i.e., to the corporation.46 Any departure from this
norm of entity representation, such as joint representation of the agents
and the corporate entity, requires additional informed consent.4 7
The second "moment" of consent in a corporate representation is
paralleled in other commercial delegations. Consider a lawyer engaged
to represent a business partnership. Whether the lawyer speaks to one
compete with the partnership. See id. at § 6.07(e).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. f (proposed
Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996).
46. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.13(a).
47. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 212 (proposed Final
Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996).
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or all partners at the outset of the representation, the attorney-client
relationship must be constituted through consent. If all partners are
present, the moment of consent is obvious. The lawyer can discuss
with the partners the form that the relationship will take (joint clients
or entity representation) and the relative capacity of the several
partners to direct the representation.
Unlike the first two, the third moment of consent may never
occur, but the lawyer should inform the client (and its agents) of its
possibility.4" While the first two moments provide the terms that
constitute the relationship, the third moment comes when the
representation (at least from the lawyer's perspective) reaches a crisis.
We can illustrate this moment using a corporate client as an example.
The lawyer takes her direction from one (or more) agents of the client.
But how can the lawyer know to rely on those directions? In large
part, a combination of the first two consents answers the question: the
agent's role is created through the corporation's internal norms,
perhaps further described in the agreement that establishes the
attorney-client relationship. So long as the agent functions within the
limits of this role, the lawyer is free to take the agent's direction. But,
if it appears to the lawyer that the agent is acting in a manner that is
inconsistent with the delegation (or against the law), Rule 1.13(b)
permits the lawyer to seek reconsideration of the matter by a higher
authority in the corporation.49 In short, the lawyer who perceives that
the agent is acting in a manner contrary to the client's best interests
goes behind the delegation to ask for further consent from someone
who may speak more reliably for the client.
48. Because this third moment of consent implies the possibility that the lawyer will have
to disclose confidences of the client-agent to the client-principal--confidences that may be adverse
to the agent's interests-the agent should have advance notice that the usual assumptions about
attorney-client confidentiality do not hold in this case. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (proposed Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996), and especially cmt. f.
49. Model Rule 1.13(b) applies in limited situations to permit the attorney to consult with
a higher authority: when an agent "is engag[ing] in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation" in a way that violates a "legal obligation to the organization
... and [that] is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." MODEL RULES, supra
note 5, Rule 1.13(b). The remedial measures include:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to
appropriate authority in the organization; and ,
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted
by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155 (2), (3).
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If a partnership chooses the entity model for its representation,
then the protections under 1.13(b) would guide the lawyer in handling
questionable conduct by a partner. If it selects a joint representation
model, the structure for this third consent is not as formalized, but it
is no less significant. As in nearly all joint representation, we start
with the lawyer's duty to keep all clients fully informed. 0 Even if
some partners have delegated their decision-making authority to
another partner, the lawyer's continuing duties to the "silent partners"
require that when the lawyer perceives that the speaking partner is
violating the trust that was delegated to her, the lawyer should return
to the silent partners for their consent before carrying out the speaking
partner's instructions.
IV. DEPENDENCY
Within a commercial relationship, the legal structure of delegation
(the agent-principal relationship), coupled with the attorney's profes-
sional obligations, protects the nonspeaking delegators from misconduct
by their agents. Delegation within marriage could, presumably, follow
these same principles. Indeed, given the formal similarities between
delegation in commercial and marital relationships, we are left with the
question of whether there is any justification for treating the two types
of delegation differently. A more general version of this question has
posed immense difficulties for scholars struggling to develop theories
about the contemporary family" and for courts faced with the array
of problems presented when marriage is no longer a legal construct that
bars members from suing or contracting with each other.
We argue that notwithstanding the similarities in form, delegation
in marriage needs to be distinguished from that in commercial
relationships because of differences in the underlying values and
expectations of marriage. Even without delegation, spouses' intimacy
50. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.4(a), 2.2(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 (proposed Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996).
51. E.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573
(1994) (reviewing MILTON C. REAGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY
(1993)); Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution
on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (1984); Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics as
Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form Over Substance in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in
North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 319, 326 (1991) (explaining that separation agreements differ
from other contracts and, consequently, the state has an interest in ensuring that these agreements
are fair and reasonable); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-
Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993).
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and mutual dependence make them vulnerable to one another;
delegation of decision-making authority only serves to increase this
vulnerability. But while commercial partners' vulnerability is limited
and instrumental, spouses' vulnerability is constitutive of their
relationship and (relatively) unlimited. As we discuss below, this
vulnerability within the family has both positive and negative aspects
with respect to marital representation.
The goal of unlimited vulnerability in marriage favors, on the one
hand, delegation without question. If we assume that both spouses
share and act on their unlimited trust in each other, then each is likely
to do nothing that could harm the other and delegation should be
entirely appropriate." When each spouse acts in the best interests of
the other and of the marital entity, there is no need for an attorney to
provide any additional protections. One might even view the ethical
protections for delegation within partnerships or corporations as an
unnecessary intrusion within the family.
On the other hand, not only do few marriages approach this ideal
(even when they try), but there is an enormous potential for abuse of
each partner's vulnerability. Obviously, where spouses have agreed
(either tacitly or explicitly) to limit their vulnerability to each other,
their marriage resembles a partnership and may not need protection
beyond that accorded to commercial delegations. The structure of the
relationship will ensure that both spouses are protected." Most
marriages, however, involve no such agreements; indeed, many would
find such agreements to be antithetical to true marital intimacy. But
this intimacy itself, coupled with traditional gender-based inequalities
within marriage, may also make the spouses especially vulnerable to
harm from each other. The depth of intimacy and trust brings both
richness and risks to marriage.
We turn first to explore the positive side of vulnerability within
the family, the justifications for delegation without question, and then
to the risks inherent in this dependency.
52. Tuttle believes this is so. Cahn believes that, even with "complete" interdependence
and trust, respect for the autonomy of each member precludes absolute delegation. On the other
hand, she also believes that, if delegation is ever going to be appropriate, this is the type of
marriage in which it should occur.
53. This vulnerability may be limited through prenuptial agreements or through custom.
See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Special Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045
(1995).
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A. Constitutive Dependency
One might think of a marriage as a particular form of partnership.
Like the commercial forms with which we are familiar, marriages
involve the sharing of risks and rewards in a cooperative activity, and
significant, perhaps even unlimited, personal liability for each other's
failures. Partners, like spouses, are vulnerable to one another. Because
their partner or spouse anticipates trustworthiness, the unfaithful
partner or spouse can inflict significantly greater harm than if the
parties were dealing at arm's length.
But commercial partnerships and marriages can, and should, be
distinguished by the respective place that trust and vulnerability play
in each. Business partnerships have a specific purpose, and partners
write their partnership agreements to limit their liability to one another
while they pursue this shared goal. Their interdependence is instru-
mental and occurs within a context that is self-limited. For the
partners, their vulnerability to one another is a necessary evil to be
endured for the sake of the ultimate goals of the enterprise.
In contrast, marriage is not a shared project, but a shared life or,
more properly, two shared lives.54 When most people marry, they
expect emotional intimacy, companionship, and sexual fulfillment with
their partner."5 They envision a "companionate marriage-the belief
that husband and wife should be each other's closest companion. '"56
Spouses entrust each other with discrete tasks, such as ensuring that
bills are paid or a child is picked up in time, and therefore one could
describe this entrustment as instrumental. Each of these tasks takes
place and receives its ultimate character within a broader relationship.
Mutual interdependence in marriage is not something to be endured in
order to achieve the goals of marriage. Instead, such interdependence
and its attendant vulnerability should be counted among the constitu-
tive goods of marriage. Marital intimacy exists in and through the
spouses' mutual interdependence.
54. Marriage is a "special relationship" in which people assume "special responsibilities for
each other ... because of the commitments that grow out of a shared life." Carl E. Schneider,
Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 197,257 (article
critiquing Ira Ellman's theory of alimony).
55. See CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK: WOMEN AND MEN MAKE
SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 212 (1990); see also Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time
of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
56. RIESSMAN, supra note 55, at 214.
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This does not mean, however, that marriage erases the separate
personhood of either spouse. Marriage is a sharing of two lives; it
depends on the consent of two who agree to be bound to one another.
One of the few studies of successful marriages found that a critical task
for creating a good marriage was for the couple to build togetherness
based on mutual identification and shared intimacy, while at the same
time respecting the autonomy of each spouse. 7 The study concludes
that "every strong marriage contains three elements: husband, wife
and the marriage itself."58  Professor Milton Regan put it this way:
"[a] person who is married typically has a sense of herself both as a
person distinct from the marriage and as someone whose identity is
defined in part by it." 9
Spouses who seek to continue as autonomous selves during
marriage and to avoid or even minimize vulnerability to each other are
missing a critical element inherent in our concept of marriage.
Concepts of autonomy for either spouse must be mediated by the
marriage. Indeed, when spouses view marriage solely as a vehicle for
self-fulfillment, they are more dissatisfied with the resulting relation-
ship than are spouses with an alternative view.6" Similarly, those who
seek to quantify this vulnerability in economic terms are unable to
account for important constitutive elements of family relationships.6'
On the other hand, not all families share this same image of
marital intimacy. Many scholars have suggested that the increase in
the divorce rate over the past three decades indicates that the public
has a very different view of contemporary marriage: that it is nothing
more than a contract for self-fulfillment.62 As a result of an increas-
57. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND
WHY LOVE LASTS (1995).
58. Joseph P. Kahn, Happily Ever After -Psychologist Judith Wallerstein's New Book Explains
What Couples Can Do After They Say "I Do," BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1995, at 31.
59. Regan, supra note 53, at 2066. He distinguishes between two different approaches to
marriage: "an 'external' stance ... that represents an individual's capacity to reflect critically
upon, rather than simply [to] identify with, her commitments and attachments . .. [and an]
internal stance ... [in which] marriage appears as a universe of shared meaning that serves as the
taken-for-granted background for individual conduct." Id. at 2049.
60. Id. at 2081 (citing studies).
61. For a sympathetic critique of the application of law and economics to the family, see
Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 989 (1995) (noting that law and economics brings attention to the value of work
performed in the household, but that its focus on finances may denigrate the significance of
interconnection); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994).
62. Barbara Whitehead, for example, blames the high divorce rate on individuals' desire for
self-fulfillment at the expense of commitment and nurturing. BARBARA WHITEHEAD, THE
DIVORCE CULTURE (1997); see Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault
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ing societal emphasis on personal psychological happiness, these
scholars believe that the focus in marriage is no longer on others, but
on the individual's own self-fulfillment.6 3  The new ideology of
families celebrates, in the words of one critic, the "Love Family,"64
which is based on choice and voluntary affiliation with another adult,
rather than on the commitment traditionally associated with marriage.
Instead of living within an ethic that celebrates relationships and
obligations to others, this new ethic celebrates obligations only to
oneself. Vulnerability and dependence (and marriage itself) are useful
only when they further individual happiness. For example, while
many parents used to believe it was important to stay together for the
children, this is no longer true.6"
Even if many couples believe that marriage is merely an opportu-
nity for personal satisfaction, the cultural ideal of unlimited intimacy
and interconnection retains its resonance. 66  As Professor Jane
Rutherford notes, it is simply an important myth that "families are
mere aggregates of separate earners who are not mutually interdepen-
dent" rather than a collective entity in which everyone engages in
sharing behavior. 67  Most couples continue to romantically view
marriage as a lifelong commitment to one another.66 In a study that
examined how recent marriage license applicants perceived the
Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503; see generally Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral
Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225 (1997) (book review).
63. WHITEHEAD, supra note 62, at 54. Professor Regan points out that there is "doubt that
there is any genuine consensus about what marriage is and what its moral obligations ought to
be." Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 605, 608. There is even doubt that marriage should connote a special status. MARTHA
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). Regardless of the future of marriage, it does carry with it certain
privileges and images; this article is based on the existing institution of marriage.
64. WHITEHEAD, supra note 62, at 144, 152.
65. Whitehead cites a study that asked women in 1962 whether they believed that parents
who did not get along with each other should stay together for the children; 49% believed this was
appropriate. By 1977, only 20% thought staying was appropriate. Id. at 82.
Studies of why people divorce affirm Whitehead's conclusions with respect to the changing
reasons for divorce. According to several studies, failure of communication or not feeling loved
are the most frequent reasons given for divorce. See RIESSMAN, supra note 55; Lynn Gigy & Joan
B. Kelly, Reason for Divorce: Perspectives of Divorcing Men and Women, 18 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 169, 186 (1992).
66. Professor Regan explores the embarrassment felt by one fictional character who has
entered into an autonomy-based marriage and suggests that readers share this embarrassment.
Regan, supra note 53, at 2080.
67. Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 539, 564 (1990).
68. Margaret Talbot, Love, American Style: What the Alarmists About Divorce Don't Get
About Idealism in America, NEW REPUB., Apr. 14, 1997, at 30.
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probability that they would divorce, Lynn Baker and Robert Emery
found that the applicants accurately estimated that approximately 50%
of all marriages end in divorce. Conversely, their "median response...
was 0% when assessing the likelihood that they personally would
divorce."69  Thus, when entering into marriage most couples incor-
rectly perceive their own likelihood to divorce. At that time, couples
expect to make, and live within, a lifelong commitment to each other.
The goal of unlimited intimacy describes a cultural ideal and normative
vision of what marriage should be. It is, perhaps, a naive vision; yet
this romantic vision inspires many people to marry.
B. Dangerous Dependency
The intimacy of marriage seems antithetical to the legalistic
procedures of informed consent and the other protections that are
afforded in commercial relationships. Such protections assume that
betrayal is not only a possibility but a real threat. When spouses need
to consciously guard against each other's unfaithfulness, this leads to
a pathological rather than a normal marriage. Such suspicion is
necessarily distancing and destroys the kind of loving trust that
intimacy entails.7" Thus, as we noted earlier, intimacy implies that
delegation between spouses should be accepted without question.
Even though we should not expect spouses to betray each other's
trust, professionals who deal with marriages and families cannot ignore
the sad reality that people who are intimate cause significant harm to
one another. Just as marital intimacy opens the possibility for some of
life's richest experiences, it also leaves spouses vulnerable to some of
life's most devastating emotional, and even physical, injuries. When
one spouse delegates to the other her decision-making authority, the
lawyer must account for the possibility that the delegation either arises
out of, or creates the opportunity for, a misuse of the delegating
spouse's trust.
69. Baker & Emery, supra note 55, at 443. Baker and Emery carefully screened out couples
who had previously been married. Because it appears that couples entering subsequent marriages
are more likely to sign prenuptial agreements, and because these couples already know that
marriage may not be forever, inclusion of such couples might have changed the results. On the
other hand, given the romanticization of marriage in our culture, there may have been no
difference. See RIESSMAN, supra note 55, at 212-17 (suggesting most divorced individuals
remarry because marriage is so important in our culture; second marriages may differ from first
marriages in areas such as gender roles).
70. On the place of rights, claims, and legal procedures in marriage, see Jeremy Waldron,
When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 625, 627-28
(1988).
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The psychological complexities of marital intimacy make the
delegation problem even more difficult." When the delegating
spouse consents to give her partner this authority, it is presumed that
she does so "rationally, . . . coldly, calculatingly, and looking out for
[herself] . . . . While emotional involvement may not cause the parties
to behave entirely irrationally, it surely alters the range of what they
consider reasonable."72  Spouses act romantically in viewing their
relationship. For example, based on their unrealistic assessments of the
length of their marriage, we can infer that many spouses are unlikely
to protect their own financial interests. They are certainly less likely
to do so than an investor or partner in a commercial venture.
The underlying vulnerability created by marital intimacy is further
complicated by the traditional gender roles expected within marriage.
As an institution, marriage has, historically, fostered inequality. Laws
regulating the family have preserved and reinforced the husband's
authority over the marital community. Until the mid-nineteenth
century, the husband was entitled to all of the wife's earnings during
the marriage.73 While women were "protected" by laws that required
their husbands to support them, these laws were rarely effective during
the marriage.74 Under the guise of the family as community, domes-
tic relations laws supported autonomy for husbands and subordination
71. E.g., MAGGIE SCARF, INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS IN LOVE AND MARRIAGE
(1987).
72. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, STACKED DECK: A STORY OF SELFISHNESS IN AMERICA
59 (1998).
73. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-83 (1994); Richard H. Chused, Married
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1982).
74. For example, the doctrine of "necessaries" required the husband to support the wife
during marriage at the level to which she had become accustomed; not only was it used extremely
infrequently, but it served to protect creditors, rather than married women. See, e.g., Note, The
Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1984).
Even after couples divorced, awards of alimony were rare. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The
Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1221 (1981); see generally IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 264-65 (2d ed. 1991). The concept of fault provided some
protection at the time of divorce, so long as it was assumed that the man was at fault. Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse notes:
The traditional fault paradigm, still dominant in some states, reflected an obsession with
controlling women and their sexuality. It had the virtue, however, of protecting (at least
in theory) those conventionally "virtuous" spouses who worked hard and kept the
promises that their partner failed to keep.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault
Era, 82 GEO. LJ. 2525, 2526 (1994).
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for wives. The rhetoric was based on "family," but protected the
rights of men.7"
Notwithstanding changes in the rhetoric and law surrounding
marriage, roles remain gendered within the family. As Robin West
explains, "[w]omen, more than men, are expected to be and to some
degree are more 'altruistic' than men in their private and intimate lives:
women, more than men, are inclined to subordinate their own interests,
desires, and pleasures to those of persons with whom they are
intimate. 7 6
The socialization that supports these roles begins very early, and
affects women's choices with respect to both work and family.77 In
marriage, wives are less likely to express their own needs and more
likely to defer to their husbands' to avoid creating any problems within
the relationship. Women still earn significantly less than men, and
marriage only exacerbates the disparity since married women earn less
than single women.78 The division of labor within marriage, wherein
women are still expected to be, and in fact still are, the primary
caretakers, makes women particularly vulnerable.79 During marriage,
spouses also evaluate their contributions to the marriage differently.
For example, men and women assign different values to the homemak-
75. While family law has moved from an image of the husband as patriarch to husband and
wife as co-equal partners, whether this has fundamentally changed the structure of marriage is
questionable. See FINEMAN, supra note 63, at 230; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital
Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2140-49
(1994).
76. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 109 (1997). The very reality of Shaffer's famous
estate planning hypothetical, where it is the wife who is somewhat unhappy with the estate plan
but does not want to create discord, is an excellent illustration of how wives subordinate their own
needs. See Shaffer, supra note 16.
77. See RHONA MAHONEY, KIDDING OURSELVES (1995); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE,
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 142-46 (1989).
78. See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD,
MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 156 (1996) (including chart
showing that married women work approximately 80% of the hours worked by unmarried women,
and are paid slightly less per hour).
79. See OKIN, supra note 77, at 138-39 ("contemporary women in our society are made
vulnerable by marriage itself.... They are disadvantaged at work by the fact that the world of
wage work, including the professions, is still largely structured around the assumption that
'workers' have wives at home."); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (1989) (discussing
women's presumed responsibilities for both work and home); Susan B. Apel, Communitarianism
and Feminism: The Case Against the Preference for the Two-Parent Family, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 23 (1995) (citing Pepper Schwartz and Arlie Hochschild to suggest that "through cultural and
other forces, [married women] are not able to bargain on an equal footing with their partners");
Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 130 (1993).
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ing that occurs during marriage.80 This may lead the higher-earning
spouse, who is generally the man, to believe that his contributions to
the marriage deserve a higher return than do those of the homemaking
spouse. In addition, the existence of domestic violence only increases
women's vulnerability. 8'
While the cultural view of marriage suggests the appropriateness
of either entity or joint representation, it also suggests the vulnerability
of one family member to another. If there is a power imbalance in the
relationship (and there often is), 82 that affects the voluntariness of
intrafamily interactions. The law does recognize different forms of
overreaching such as unconscionability of terms, mental capacity, and
duress. In the context of estate planning83 in an intimate relationship,
voluntariness may be affected by other factors as well, including men
and women's different earning abilities84 and women's socialization
toward intimacy and marriage. Legal representation must take into
account these internal dynamics of any marriage lest it perpetuate
potential subordination.
80. E.g., Betsy Morris Lixandra Urresta, It's Her Job Too: Lorna Wendt's $20 Million
Divorce Case is the Shot Heard "Round the Water Cooler," FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 64
(including poll showing that 57% of women, and 41% of men agree that a woman's "managing
the household and child rearing are extremely important to a husband's success"; and that 51%
of women, and 28% of men, agree that "a corporate wife who also must travel, entertain, and act
as a sounding board is extremely important to the success of a high-level business executive.").
81. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991). Approximately four million women are battered each
year and are subjected to the power and control of their intimate partners. See Development in
the Law - Legal Response to Domestic Violence: III, New State and Federal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1529 (1993).
82. See also Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process:
Lesson from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 263 (1993) (reporting on
studies showing that "in any given setting," men are given more credibility than are women); but
see Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Gender on Clinical Negotiating Achievement, 6 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RES. 1, 2 (1990) (reporting that in negotiation class, gender has no discernible impact
on outcome). Notwithstanding his experiences, Professor Craver does cite to studies showing that
men speak more than women and feel more able to influence people negotiating on their behalf.
Id. at 3, nn.10-15.
83. See generally, JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES, ch. 3 (2d ed. 1996). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15
("Mental Illness or Defect") 178 ("When a Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy")
(1981). As Milton Regan points out, "contract law generally is inadequate to deal with" the
dynamics inherent in a (formerly) intimate relationship. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW
AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 151 (1993).
84. Indeed, many theorists who have used law and economics to develop a theory of
alimony have relied on this differential to show the benefits of gender-specific behaviors during
marriage. See GARY STANLEY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (revised ed. 1991). For
a critique, see Singer, supra note 61.
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Unlike the well-developed protections for those made vulnerable
within commercial relationships, the law has been ambivalent about
affording protection for marital vulnerabilities. In part, this can be
explained by a salutary respect for the distinct nature of marital
intimacy; we expect the law to step in to marriages only in the case of
emergencies, when the relationship has broken down. Intimacy, as we
suggested earlier, seems antithetical to legal ordering. But the law's
ambivalence can also be explained by a traditional separation of public
and private spheres. The household belongs to a different and
traditionally paternal ordering-a "separate sphere" that is immune to
the public law's governance. 85
Courts in community property jurisdictions have imposed
fiduciary duties on spouses handling property belonging to the marital
community, but otherwise courts have generally refused to imply any
legal obligations between spouses in an ongoing marriage. 86 The law
steps in and establishes minimal conditions to protect a vulnerable
spouse only at dissolution of the marriage through divorce or the death
of a spouse.87 Even in tort lawsuits between spouses, the husband
and wife are held to different standards than are strangers.88 The law
is a very blunt instrument for enforcing interspousal obligations.
In light of the vulnerabilities of marital intimacy and the relative
absence of ongoing legal structure, it is particularly easy for one
spouse, generally the one who maintains financial control,89 to abuse
85. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination
and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117, 118-27 (Kairys
D., ed., 1982).
86. For community property jurisdictions, see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (West 1992)
(establishing fiduciary duties for interspousal transactions); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (West
1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.15 (West 1983) ("Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect
to the other spouse in matters involving marital property or other property of the other spouse.
This obligation may not be varied by a marital property agreement."). See also Roselli v. Rio
Communities Serv. Station Inc., 787 P.2d 428, 432 (N.M. 1990) (establishing fiduciary duty of
spouse managing marital property). Such obligations are rarely recognized outside community
property jurisdictions. See Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (holding
that Maryland does not "presume the existence of a confidential relationship in transactions
between husband and wife"). But see Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (1977) (holding
that "[a]greements between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary
relationship requiring the utmost of good faith.").
87. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); PETER SWISHER ET AL.,
FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS ch. 2 (forthcoming 1998). The elective
share protections are discussed infra, text and nn.115-16.
88. Courts are extremely reluctant to allow tort suits based on negligence to proceed,
although they now generally accept intentional tort lawsuits. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 87, ch.
6.
89. The economically dominant position in the family has traditionally been assumed by
men (although the second hypothetical shows that the woman may be the more powerful spouse).
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the trust of the other. This misappropriation may or may not be
intentional. In the second hypothetical, the wife may be acting in the
parties' short-term interests without considering long-term consequenc-
es for each party individually. For example, she might want to remain
a member of the practice without thinking about the possibility of her
dying first, and leaving Joe without any claims to her share of the
medical practice. Alternatively, if she is at the early stages of
considering a separation or divorce from Joe, but has not yet told him,
then she will intentionally prevent him from having any claims to the
assets of the practice.
Whether the breach is intentional or unintentional, the lawyer
cannot ignore the possibility that the delegating spouse will be
substantially harmed by her mate. In the next section, we offer a
constructive account of the lawyer's professional obligation in handling
the risk that the delegating spouse's trust has been betrayed.
V. MARITAL REPRESENTATION
How, then, in light of the special nature of marriage, should the
legal ethics of marital representation protect the spouse who delegates
her decision-making authority to her mate? We start with a threshold
claim: intra-family representation deserves at least the same structure
of protection as do other multiparty representations. As we discussed
earlier, lawyers who represent multiple clients in the same matter need
each party's informed consent at the outset of the representation. 90
In our hypothetical problems, informed consent principally serves to
protect the interests of the nonspeaking spouse, though it also ensures
that the speaking spouse understands her obligations within the
relationship.
The breadwinner position is "gendered male," even if it is the woman who occupies that role.
For a discussion of the differences between gender and sex, see Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 12-13 (1995).
90. This is technically true only when the representation involves the possibility of conflicts
between the clients' interests. However, Model Rule 1.7(b)(2) may be read to suggest a broader
requirement of informed consent, one that would affect any joint representation: "When
representation of multiple clients in [the same] matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved." MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.7(b)(2). Because delegation by one client to
another of decision-making authority within the relationship creates a risk of harm to the
nonspeaking client (and a self-limitation on her ability to control the attorney-client relationship),
it would seem to present a "material limitation" under the terms of Model Rule 1.7(b). Under
Model Rule 2.2, the consultation requirement is peremptory; it does not depend on a prior
judgment that a conflict is likely. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 2.2(a)(1).
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A. Ensuring Informed Consent
Informed consent within this context should have four main
components.
1. Both spouses must understand the powers that will be delegated
and the consequences of that delegation.
The moral quality of the delegation depends, in large part, on the
extent to which the delegating spouse understands what she is giving
her spouse. A spouse who says that her mate will "make all the
decisions" may not necessarily comprehend the meaning of "all the
decisions." Especially when the delegation is coupled with a general
power of attorney, the lawyer must ensure that the delegating spouse
understands the extent of her present rights. This includes not only
the property that she now holds, but her existing legal rights, such as
elective share protections upon death or equitable distribution
provisions upon divorce. This would be particularly important in the
second hypothetical where Joe, the delegating spouse, may not
understand the extent of his rights in assets that his wife has acquired
during marriage, even if the assets are separately titled. 91
If the speaking spouse objects to the range of information that the
lawyer seeks to discuss with the nonspeaking spouse, the lawyer should
approach the representation with extreme caution. Using the second
hypothetical, what should the lawyer do if Susan objects to the lawyer's
full discussion of Joe's rights in equitable dissolution? In this
relationship, and in many other multiparty representations, full
disclosure of a co-client's rights is an absolute prerequisite to that
client's informed consent to the common representation. 92  The
mechanics of "full sharing" may differ somewhat, based on the extent
of the lawyer's concerns about the nonspeaking spouse's vulnerability.
Though it may be acceptable in some circumstances for the lawyer to
discuss the representation with both spouses present, in other
circumstances, the lawyer may want to gain informed consent from
91. Under the laws of virtually all states, both common law title and community property
assets acquired during the course of the marriage, regardless of who holds title, are subject to
distribution upon divorce. In some states, separate assets, including those acquired before the
marriage, may also be subject to distribution. See, e.g., LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW
329-31 (1996).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 (proposed Final
Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996) ("Informed consent requires that the client or former client have
reasonably adequate information about the material risks of such representation to that client or
former client.").
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each spouse alone. Particularly when the lawyer senses some reluc-
tance on the part of one (or both) spouses, separate consultations may
provide a greater degree of confidence that the delegation is both
knowing and voluntary.
2. The spouses must understand the lawyer's duties within the
relationship, including the lawyer's continuing duty to consult
with both spouses.
While the first component of informed consent simply ensures
that the spouses understand the choices they have made, the second
and third components represent constraints on the delegation.
Although the clients may desire it, the lawyer should not agree to a
representation in which the lawyer is forbidden to communicate
directly with the nonspeaking spouse (and that spouse with the lawyer)
outside the presence of the other spouse. While such consultation may
not be needed, the lawyer should always hold open its possibility. The
delegation grants the speaking spouse power to act on his mate's
behalf, but, absent extreme circumstances, it does not give him the
power to isolate her.93
In addition to protecting the nonspeaking spouse, this component
also provides important advance notice to the speaking spouse. The
lawyer's continuing duty to consult with both spouses will typically
mean that the lawyer has no independent duty to keep the confidences
of one spouse separate from the other.94 Where spouses particularly
wish the lawyer keep separate confidences, the lawyer should question
the feasibility of the joint representation.
93. There may be some circumstances in which the isolation was required. One can
imagine a religious community in which married women are barred from speaking with men
outside their family. In such circumstances, the lawyer might agree to the joint representation
only if the delegation is accompanied by substantial fiduciary obligations. The woman's silence
may be regarded as a form of incapacity, and she should be protected as stringently as the law
protects others who are incapable of protecting themselves, either through a guardianship or
conservatorship.
94. The comments to § 112 of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers suggest an
appropriate solution to the dilemma posed by an absolute duty to share with both spouses any
confidences obtained from one spouse. The comments ask what a lawyer should do when one
joint client discloses information that he or she would find embarrassing or harmful if conveyed
to the other spouse/joint client. The Restatement asserts that a lawyer may not continue
representation without full disclosure, but concludes that a lawyer in such circumstances should
have the discretion to withdraw rather than share the information. RESTATEMENT (THIRD):
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112, cmts. (proposed Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996).
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3. The spouses must understand that the delegation is revocable.
This third component provides an additional constraint on the
delegation. The delegating spouse must understand that she may
withdraw her consent at any time. The nonspeaking spouse retains
ultimate authority over her life and possessions at all times, even if her
mate has the temporary legal authority to act on her behalf. This will
always be true with respect to the delegating spouse's decision about
her personal rights, but may be complicated by certain property
arrangements. If, as part of the representation, the spouses elect to put
their assets in an irrevocable trust that will be administered by the
speaking spouse, the nonspeaking spouse will have permanently
alienated her property interests. For that reason, a lawyer should take
extreme caution when drafting irrevocable trusts that do not provide
both spouses (or an impartial person) with continuing authority to
manage their assets. 95
Many commentators would object to our heavy reliance on
informed consent, especially in the context of marital representation.
Professor Shaffer, for example, links consent-based models with an
underlying philosophy of atomistic individualism. 6 As a proxy for
individual choice, consent, according to Shaffer, denies the organic
nature of family relationships: consent implies that we choose our
relationships, that we choose the duties we have to one another, and,
more importantly, that these relationships have moral significance
precisely (and only) because we choose them. While we believe that
Professor Shaffer captures and critiques a central element of the
professional codes, we do not believe that respect for individual consent
must entail a denial of the constitutive role of families and other
relationships. We are not selves apart from our relationships.
However, while our relationships are always relations between
persons who exist in and through relations, they are between persons
nevertheless. Although relations give us our identities, they can also
destroy us. We know this from the sad facts of child abuse and
95. An irrevocable gift presents a somewhat different question than does an irrevocable trust
(where the settlor remains a beneficiary). In the case of a gift, it is relatively easy for the lawyer
to explain to the client the implications of the transfer: once the gift is made, the client-donor
should have no expectation of continuing control or benefit from the transfer. An irrevocable
trust, where the settlor is a beneficiary of the trust, is different because in such cases the client-
settlor does have continuing expectations of benefit and control. When the trust is drafted in a
way that creates maximum discretion for the trustee, who is the client- settlor's spouse, the client
may anticipate protections that the law does not provide.
96. Shaffer, supra note 16, at 974-75.
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spousal abuse, although vulnerability persists even without physical
abuse. Consent need not be seen as the affirmation of the Kantian self,
detached from and prior to relationships. It can also be seen as
recognition of human frailty, a recognition of our need for protection
even within constitutive relations.
Feminists and postmodernists have criticized the notion of choice
for failing to recognize the constructed nature of "autonomy" and"consent." In particular, they have explored the structuring of
women's choices.97 Their general claim is that the liberal rhetoric of
choice diverts attention from "the constraints within which an
individual's choice occurs onto the act of choice itself."98  That is,
instead of looking at what is chosen, we need to examine the parame-
ters in which choice occurs and the ideologies that structure any
particular "choice." Yet, at the same time, there is debate over
whether an acknowledgment of that ideology implies that individuals
have no control over their lives." The problem with consent, it is
argued, is that all choice is limited by the context in which it is made
and by the contexts that surround and affect the decisionmaker."'0
Consequently, although there can be no such thing as unfettered choice
or autonomy, individuals are, nonetheless, semiautonomous beings who
have a limited freedom to make choices within social constraints.
We agree that a consent to full delegation is not unproblematic
given the social context in which such consents are given. In the two
hypotheticals, the delegating spouses may be ceding too much power
without fully recognizing what they are doing, even after the lawyer
has patiently explained the meaning and scope of the delegation. Their
consents result from various inequalities that are beyond their
97. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy or Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the
Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369 (1992) (book review); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work; Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749
(1990); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559 (1991); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1988); see
also CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 217
(1987) (exploring issues of false consciousness).
98. Williams, supra note 97, at 1564; Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice
Thurgood Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2093 (1992). Catharine MacKinnon adopts an even more
radical perspective, arguing that there is no such thing as "choice" for women. MACKINNON,
supra note 97.
99. See Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 795 (1990);
Judith Greenberg, Introduction, to MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM ix, xxix
(1992).
100. There is a rich feminist literature on agency and victimization. See, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
304 (1995); see also Schultz, supra note 97 (noting conflicting stories of women's "choices").
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individual control and, thus, are not the acts of fully autonomous
individuals."'
Nonetheless, while consent at the beginning of the delegation is
not determinative, it is a preliminary step that must be put into the
context that we will discuss later. Obviously, without full and
informed consent, there can be no delegation. Where there has been
full and informed consent, this consent provides a helpful tool for
allowing the representation to proceed. But consent is not equivalent
to a complete and total abrogation of the lawyer's responsibility; it does
not, and cannot, prevent further discussion with the delegating spouse
about matters within the scope of the delegation.
4. The spouses must understand that the consent obtained at the
beginning of the representation will be revisited when the delegated
spouse takes action that may "substantially injure"
the delegating spouse.
If the delegating spouse seeks to relinquish all power to the other
spouse, the lawyer should still have various obligations to prevent
actions that may "substantially injure"' 2 the delegating spouse.
These obligations stem from the lawyer's professional obligations. °3
When actions may "substantially injure" the other spouse, the lawyer
must (literally) revisit the nonspeaking spouse to ensure consent to this
further course of action. Even where the potential action otherwise
appears to be well within the scope of the written delegation (and most
likely would not be the basis for a malpractice action), we would place
an obligation on the attorney to contact the nonspeaking spouse. The
attorney must actually speak with, or obtain written consent from, the
nonspeaking spouse; using the speaking spouse as an intermediary is
insufficient.0 4
101. The question of whether anyone is a "fully autonomous individual" we leave for
others. There are, however, people who operate with more or less autonomy, depending on the
context.
102. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.13.
103. Professor Collett believes that the delegating spouse must participate in the process of
arriving at a decision. Collett, Love Among the Ruins: The Ethics of Counseling Happily Married
Couples, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139 (1998). Such participation appears to be contrary to the
full delegation sought by Ruth in Hypothetical I. Like Professor Collett, we believe that the
delegating spouse's participation is important; when that spouse has indicated that she seeks
complete delegation, however, we impose some minimal obligation on the lawyer to protect her
interests.
104. In one case, a court was unwilling to find malpractice when a lawyer sought to obtain
a wife's consent to a certain course of action by sending her letters; the lawyer never actually
communicated with her. See Barth v. Reagan, 564 N.E.2d 1196 (Il1. 1990). The actions taken
by the lawyer in Barth are, under our model, inadequate as a matter of law. The lawyer must
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The "substantially injure" standard is drawn from Rule 1.13(b) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."' As discussed earlier,
the rules allow the lawyer representing an organization to consult with
someone other than the agent when the agent's action both violates a
"legal obligation to the organization" and becomes "likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization." ''"6 Unlike within the organi-
zational context, the "legal obligations" between spouses provide an
inadequate basis for an ethical rule; the marital rule focuses on the"substantially injure" prong of the inquiry. Commercial entities
operate against a background of long-standing, well-established, and
relatively specific legal obligations that affect the ongoing nature of
their enterprises. In the family, however, there is no such legal
background. Outside of a few exceptions, the traditional "veil of
privacy" has shielded the ongoing family from the development of
detailed regulations setting out one family member's legal obligations
to another. 107
actually communicate with the delegating spouse, and may even need to obtain a written consent
to the proposed action. Any other procedure should result in malpractice.
105. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.13(b).
106. Id. The Restatement provides that:
[When the] lawyer representing an organization knows of circumstances indicating that
a constituent of the organization has engaged in action ... that violates a legal
obligation to the organization that will likely cause substantial injury to it, or that
reasonably can be foreseen to be imputable to the organization and thus [is] likely to
result in substantial injury to it, the lawyer must proceed in what the lawyer reasonably
believes to be the best interests of the organization.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1S5(2) (tentative Draft No. 8
Mar. 21, 1997). The comments indicate that a lawyer must intervene not just in the situation
contemplated by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but also must "tak[e] steps to prevent
reasonably foreseeable harm to a client." Id. cmt. e. The Restatement approach differs from that
of the Model Rules because it mandates, rather than permits, the lawyer to act.
107. While the "veil of privacy" has served to legitimate power imbalances within the
family, it has also (simultaneously and almost paradoxically) served to preserve the family as a
place of intimacy and vulnerability.
It remains important to preserve the dependency that occurs in familial relationships.
Nonetheless, is also important to delegitimate the power imbalances, as recognized by some of the
exceptions to this lack of regulation of the ongoing family. These exceptions include the area of
domestic violence, in which advocacy organizations have struggled against the concept of marital
privacy to develop protections for battered women. But see Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love":
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178-87 (1996) (arguing that while
changes in discourse concerning domestic violence have helped battered women, the old laws have
been "preserv[ed] through transformation.").
With respect to economic interests, community property states have imposed fiduciary
obligations on spouses in their dealings with marital property. See supra note 86. Outside of
community property states, however, it is difficult to find examples of when states have imposed
fiduciary obligations on one spouse with respect to the other. In the cases of spouses' elective
shares and intestacy, which provide mandatory shares for the surviving spouse, the states are
creating default rules; the decedent has no obligation (fiduciary or otherwise) to provide for the
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Accordingly, we rely on lawyers not to participate in an action
that causes "substantial injury" when representing the marital
entity."°8 The meaning of "substantially injure" will, necessarily, be
context-specific and will have both objective and subjective elements
that focus on the fairness of the proposed action.
The lawyer must make a two-fold inquiry: would this proposed
action substantially injure any client, and would the action substantially
injure this particular client? As a general guide, in making the
objective inquiry, the lawyer should determine whether a proposed
action could result in severe financial harm to the consenting spouse.
In making the subjective inquiry, the lawyer should examine whether
the action could inflict substantial emotional or other noneconomic harm
on this particular spouse.
When the delegated spouse wants to hold the action confidential,
that should send up a red flag for the attorney, at least on a subjective
level, that the action might substantially injure the other spouse. (It
may also be a violation of the delegation itself-as we discussed above,
the delegation should assume that the nonspeaking spouse will, at all
times, have access to any desired information about the representation.)
If the delegated spouse wishes to take an action that would pose
unreasonable economic risks to the family entity, that too suggests the
need to revisit the delegation, from an objective perspective. Similarly,
if the delegated spouse seeks to alienate a significant amount of marital
resources to a third person, particularly one who is not a close family
member, we believe that that might require the lawyer to inform the
delegating spouse of the consequences of proceeding based on both
objective and subjective perceptions of potential harm.
If the delegating spouse consents to these actions, then the lawyer
has fulfilled her ethical obligations and need make no further response.
Of course, if the lawyer feels that continuing the representation forces
her to "pursu[e] an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or
imprudent," then the lawyer may withdraw."°9  Withdrawal is a
possibility at any time during the representation, so long as it does not
have a "material adverse effect" on the client's interests. 1°
surviving spouse.
By not developing rules for the ongoing family, the state ratifies the status quo. See Frances
E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985).
108. This approach appears similar to the Restatement's requirements for lawyers
representing organizations.
109. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983). The rule also allows for
withdrawal when there is other good cause.
110. Id.
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The implications of the four requirements become more concrete
as we apply the model to various hypotheticals based on Hypotheticals
I and II.1"
B. Informed Consent in Context: Hypothetical I
1. Imagine that Bob wants Ruth to transfer all of her assets
to him to help in his business.
He discloses that he is about to lose his ownership of the local
Internet access provider to a competitor and his commercial enterprise
will become even more risky. This presents, to us, a relatively easy
case. This situation seems to involve risks that a business person
would ordinarily foresee and undertake; risks that are not "unreason-
able." By marrying Bob, and depending on him to support her, Ruth
has already agreed to share in the economic downturns of Bob's
business. This is especially true if Ruth expressly delegates to Bob the
authority to use her assets to further his business ventures.
Two different scenarios might lead us to consider the risk
unreasonable, however. First, if Bob were to place only Ruth's assets
at risk, and not his own, we would be more likely to scrutinize the
transaction. But here, the risk is shared; Bob's own assets are just as
much at risk as Ruth's. Second, although we would not impose a"prudent investor" rule"2 on Bob, the lawyer would be obliged to
ask Bob to reconsider reckless investments-such as using the money
to purchase a large number of lottery tickets.
2. As part of the estate plan, Bob would like a will that provides
that, if he dies first, all of the assets will be left to their children.
Bob tells the lawyer that he does not believe that Ruth will have
the financial acumen to manage their assets, and that he is certain the
children will honor their obligations to their mother and support her.
He also wants Ruth to relinquish any rights to an elective share under
state statutes.
This clearly has the potential to "substantially injure" Ruth. Ruth
will hold no assets in her own name nor jointly with Bob. If Bob dies
first, and this is statistically likely, then Ruth will have no means of
supporting herself and will be completely dependent on their chil-
111. For the text of hypotheticals, see 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, app. at 14 (1998).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
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dren."' As a subjective matter, it may be possible to assume that
Ruth believes that her children will take care of her and that Bob will
not take any actions to harm her, and, thus, would consent. Neverthe-
less, the lawyer must step back and apply an objective approach.
Objectively, Bob's proposal may substantially harm Ruth if he dies
first, leaving her without any of her own resources and at the mercy of
the children's discretion.114
Moreover, his request that she relinquish her elective share is also
injurious. Elective share statutes allow the surviving spouse to choose
to take under the will or to elect an amount that is typically one-third
of the estate." 5 Although a spouse can waive her right to an elective
share, so long as it is in writing, states typically require fair disclosure
before the waiver is effective. The Uniform Probate Code prevents the
enforcement of waivers that were not executed voluntarily, or that were
both unconscionable when executed and executed in the absence of
disclosure of the property at issue.116
To ensure the validity of the waiver, the attorney must therefore
consult with Ruth. The lawyer must inform Ruth of the consequences
of this course of action before acceding to Bob's request to leave all
assets to their children. There should be an actual conversation
between Ruth and the lawyer. Ideally, this should be done face-to-face
rather than on the telephone.
The lawyer must display sensitivity to, and respect for, Bob and
Ruth's marriage. One way to do this is to explain that Ruth is being
contacted just to ensure her understanding of the course of action.
The lawyer should explain the estate plan to Ruth in detail, reviewing
not only the legalities of the will, but also its consequences. The
113. If the couple were to divorce, Ruth would at least be entitled to an equitable
distribution of assets acquired during the marriage. We are not concerned about divorce because
we are assuming that Ruth's and Bob's religious beliefs preclude divorce. Bob could require Ruth
to execute an agreement concerning divorce if this were a serious concern.
114. For the typical estate plan, Bob's death would leave Ruth at least a life estate in his
assets, and studies show that most people want their entire estate to go to their spouse. See, e.g.,
Mary Louise Fellows, et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 348-364. If Bob died
intestate, the Uniform Probate Code provides that, if there are no descendants, then the surviving
spouse is entitled to the entire intestate estate. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 1993),
8 U.L.A. (Supp. 1995).
115. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 83, at 400. The Uniform Probate Code
provides for an elective share based on the amount of time the spouses were married. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE, supra note 114, at § 2-102.
116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE supra note 114, at § 2-213. This is a similar standard for
judging the validity of prenuptial agreements. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 83,
at 534-35.
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lawyer should explore various scenarios that might result if Bob were
to die first. For example, while the lawyer could assume that Ruth's
children would treat her with great respect, what if the children were
to die first, leaving their spouses who did not treat Ruth with the same
respect?
If Ruth consents, which seems likely under the facts of the
hypothetical, then the lawyer may proceed to draft the appropriate
documents, including the waiver. While we, as the lawyers involved,
might try to withdraw because of our strong disapproval of Bob's plan,
we have no obligation to do so; the clients' interests remain in
harmony, and the notion of client consent carries significant moral
weight.
3. Imagine that, unknown to Ruth, Bob's customers are gambling
casinos, adult video stores, or other commercial operations that, for
many traditional religions, raise questions of morality.
As part of Ruth's agreement to give him access to all of her assets,
Bob wants to use the money to better promote his business. His goal
remains to ensure the economic comfort of his family.
The question is whether that rises to the level of harm necessary
to revisit the delegation. Objectively, the business does not involve
any particular economic risk or speculation. There is, however, a
significant potential for subjective harm in this case-the harm of
possible embarrassment and scandal if Ruth did not know the nature
of the business of her husband's clients, but subsequently discovers
that she has been subsidizing them. We find this situation extremely
difficult because it involves the kind of trust that married people place
in each other: Ruth has trusted Bob to pursue their shared interests,
and Bob has drawn them into activities that Ruth would, without
doubt, consider sinful. Here, Ruth's religious beliefs become directly
relevant to the lawyer's assessment of the situation. While Ruth's
beliefs have led her to delegate her authority, they also may lead her
to suffer great harm if Bob continues in this enterprise. Because
Ruth's assets are involved, she may feel that she, too, is implicated in
what she deems sinful.
Considering her faith commitments, we would find that Bob's acts
amount to "substantial injury" to Ruth and, thus, we would impose
certain obligations on the lawyer. If Bob were to ask the lawyer about
the advisability of the investment in this business, the lawyer should
address the concerns about Ruth's likely reaction to any disclosure of
the investments and counsel Bob to discuss the investment with Ruth.
If Bob refuses to do so, and asks the lawyer to draft documents
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facilitating a transfer of Ruth's assets into this business, then the
lawyer should object and decline to perform the tasks. After explain-
ing to Bob the reason for this refusal, the lawyer should inform Bob of
his right to seek the assistance of a different attorney.
But should the attorney disclose this information to Ruth?
Assuming that the lawyer made clear her professional responsibilities
to both clients at the outset of the investigation, Bob would have no
basis for complaining about any such disclosure. However, we do not
believe that such disclosure is mandated in this case. The lawyer
should recommend to Bob that he disclose (or divest), but the lawyer
should recognize that disclosure itself could be harmful to Ruth by
destroying her trust in Bob. On balance, given that the investments
are not likely to cause long-term objective harm to Ruth, we would
give the lawyer discretion to decide whether or not to disclose Bob's
investments to Ruth.117
4. Imagine that Bob has worked for several years, quite
closely, with a secretary.
a. What if Bob wants to leave part of the estate to his"trusted" secretary?
As discussed earlier, spouses typically expect an estate to stay
within the family. Nonetheless, an aspect of one spouse delegating
authority to the other must be an expectation that the other spouse
may take some actions that would be contrary to assumptions
concerning who would normally be a beneficiary. Bob leaving some
assets to the secretary would not be economically harmful to Ruth on
an objective basis. Subjectively, this would not substantially damage
her, given her faith and trust in him.
On the other hand, a large gift to someone outside of the family
is contrary to the expectations of most married people. If Bob were to
leave a significant portion of his estate to someone outside the family,
this would involve objective harm to Ruth. This should, in turn,
trigger the lawyer's obligation to disclose Bob's intended disposition to
Ruth. But, if we assume that Bob leaves sufficient money to Ruth,
then she is not, objectively, harmed by a gift to someone outside the
family. Subjectively, so long as the gift really is to someone who is
simply a trusted secretary, then Ruth would presumably not be harmed
by this gift. Such a gift would appear to be well within the scope of
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 and illus. 2,
3 (proposed Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996) (confronting similar disclosure questions).
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delegation. Ruth trusts her husband, which is why she has delegated
authority to him, and his making a moderate gift to his secretary would
not appear to be outside the scope of his delegated authority. As a
final protection, Ruth will sign her own will, and will have the
opportunity to review its provisions then.
b. What if Bob discloses a sexual relationship with this secretary?
This hypothetical returns us to a problem addressed in the
example above, in which Bob has invested in a business that Ruth
would find morally objectionable. Let us assume, first, that the
bequest to the secretary would consume most of the assets in Bob's
estate. Where Ruth's interests are objectively harmed, we feel that the
answer is relatively clear: the lawyer must tell Bob that if he wishes to
provide for his secretary in his will, which is part of a unified estate
plan with Ruth's, he must disclose the bequest to Ruth.
If we assume, however, that the bequest would be relatively
minor, then the answer to this question turns (almost) solely on the
subjective harm to Ruth. Here we return to the analysis from the
above example. If, after consulting with the lawyer, Bob refuses to
discuss the matter with Ruth, should the lawyer disclose to Ruth the
existence of the minor bequest (and perhaps even Bob's justification for
it)? Here, Bob's wrongdoing goes to the core of the marital interde-
pendence that justifies the delegation in the first place. The subjective
harm to Ruth in this instance seems even greater than Bob's "wrong-
ful" investments.
We recognize that the lawyer's disclosure of the bequest, and
certainly a disclosure of Bob's infidelity, would bring Ruth pain, but
the ultimate cause of the pain is not the disclosure, but Bob's infidelity.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers would grant
the lawyer discretion not to disclose the co-client spouse's confidences
in a very similar case (where the co-client wants to leave money to an
undisclosed, illegitimate child)." 8  While we would agree with this
grant of discretion, we disagree with the Restatement's conclusion that
the lawyer could draft the bequest, fail to disclose, and then continue
to represent both spouses. If the bequest, because of Bob's relationship
with the secretary, would be expected to cause such subjective harm to
Ruth, we believe that the lawyer may not draft the bequest. The
lawyer may have discretion not to disclose Bob's relationship with his
118. Id.
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secretary, but the lawyer must withdraw if Bob refuses to disclose the
relationship.
C. Informed Consent in Context: Hypothetical II
1. What if, under Hypothetical II, Joe, upon full disclosure of his
spousal rights on death or divorce, nonetheless agrees to forego any
interest in his wife's medical practice?
Joe's relinquishment of his rights in the second hypothetical is less
problematic under the model set out above. First, his waiver is far
more discrete than the one proposed by Ruth. Joe is only giving up
any rights he might have with respect to his wife's practice; his waiver
does not affect any claims he might have to any other asset that might
be owned by his wife. Second, his waiver is time-bound. It will
expire if his wife leaves the medical practice. The limited nature of his
waiver thus requires less protection than the unlimited delegation of
decision-making power over all estate planning envisioned under the
first hypothetical.
In Joe's case, the four requirements are satisfied quite easily
because, by explaining the nature of the delegation and its consequenc-
es, the lawyer is ensuring consent and also discussing the possibility of
"substantial harm."
2. What if Joe is Josefina, and Susan is Sam: does changing the
sex of the parties change the amount of protection we would accord?
No. Joe, or Josefina, has assumed the role that is gendered female
within marriage. Historically, although it has been women who have
given up their jobs and stayed home with children, we are concerned
about the dependency associated with this role, not with the sex of its
occupant. The four different requirements of delegation are sufficient
to ensure that the more apparently dependent spouse is protected.119
119. In Hypothetical I, if Ruth wanted complete delegation and had no assets, the four
ethical requirements of a lawyer in a delegating situation should serve to protect her as well. We
have developed the requirements to protect against an abuse of the vulnerability in marriage.
While women have historically needed this protection, the requirements apply regardless of the
sex of the spouse who appears more dependent.
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D. Objections to the Requirements of Informed Consent
In suggesting a more interventionist approach' to marital
representation, we may be accused of paternalism, 2' of reinforcing
stereotypes about wives, of providing safeguards within the family that
differentiate it too much from commercial entities, and of not
respecting client voice. On the other hand, we may be accused of not
providing enough protection.
First, the requirements for delegation within marital representation
might appear too protective of the delegating spouse by not allowing
her to make her own choice with respect to granting authority to her
spouse. This "paternalism" does not deny choice within the relation-
ship; we are ensuring that there is adequate information to reinforce
the preliminary choice made, as well as adequate protection to ensure
the integrity of that choice.
Moreover, the purpose of this Article is to argue that we must
treat the family differently from commercial entities because of the
nature of intrafamilial obligations and because of the inequalities that
currently exist within the structure of the family. Ultimately, we are
trying to provide enough of a check so that representation is consistent
with, and preserves, our cultural notions of marriage. When spouses
assume equal participatory roles, there is much less need for protection.
But, it is also important that spouses "who undertake more traditional
domestic roles are protected from the risks they presently incur. "112
Accordingly, because of the inequality that is almost inherent in
contemporary marriage, we believe that it is appropriate to require
special scrutiny of marital representation.
Requiring the lawyer to revisit the delegation when the delegated
spouse takes action that might "substantially injure" the delegating
spouse may have the appearance of overriding client voice. We may
be accused of not allowing clients to speak. Within legal ethics, a
critique of paternalism has developed suggesting that, particularly in
the poverty law context, lawyers routinely usurp client control and
120. We want to note that "intervention" and "nonintervention" are confused concepts; by
not "intervening," the state encourages the continuation of status quo inequalities. Olsen, supra
note 107.
121. Brian Bix states "attempts to protect often have unintended negative consequences
(beyond the mere withdrawal of choice)." Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The
Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Love 57 (unpublished manuscript)
(copy on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
122. OKIN, supra note 77, at 183.
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power.'23 The client-centered critique argues that it is up to clients
to make their own legal decisions. 124 The client-centered model is
skeptical about the traditional legal ethics approach. It argues that the
traditional approach is designed to encourage clients to cede authority
to their lawyers, and that the traditional approach incorrectly assumes
that lawyers provide effective, competent, and professional representa-
tion so that clients need not be concerned with abuse of authority. 125
Rather than giving clients advice as to the appropriate course of
actions, lawyers should, under this model, seek to foster and respect
client voice and decision-making.1 26 A lawyer who did not allow the
123. One group of scholars concerned with client-centeredness has examined its potential
for working with excluded and/or impoverished communities, arguing that client-centered
representation can lead to empowerment for the client. E.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antimonies
of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659,
665 (1987-88) (discussing poverty law); Binny Miller, Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994) (discussing criminal defense). Professor
Gerald Lopez seeks to articulate a "rebellious" form of lawyering, in which lawyers "work with,
not just on behalf of, subordinated people." See Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights
Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaberation, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989);
see also Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989) (suggesting changes
in legal education to prepare students to engage in this rebellious style of lawyering); Gerald P.
Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1985) (pointing out that
modern legal education does not seek to address, much less understand, the concerns of low-
income women of color). Tony Alfieri suggests strategies that allow the lawyer to reinterpret
client stories to break out of client stereotypes. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991). And Lucie White and Clark
Cunningham focus us on how lawyers shape their clients' stories. Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV.
1 (1990); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989). In her "Story of Mrs. G.," Professor White traces the different
influences on how her client's stories were constructed, including language, poverty, race, and
gender. She also discusses how the lawyer, working with the client, constructed one story; at the
actual hearing, the client told her own, somewhat different story, and the lawyer suddenly felt on
the outside.
124. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697, 714
(1991) (book review) (setting out the potential conflict between client-centered decision-making
and the lawyer's moral autonomy). For discussion of the client-centered approach, see BINDER
ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991), and see Stephen
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public
Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1128-29 (1992) (summarizing
client-centered approach).
125. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 506 (1990). Dinerstein also notes that the client-centered approach may be
incompatible with the professional responsibility rules because the rules are so vague with respect
to the appropriate allocation of authority between lawyer and client. Id. at 534-35.
126. See Dinerstein, supra note 125, at 587 (suggesting that lawyers should be able to give
their advice in at least some situations, and that clients should be able to opt out of this model).
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complete delegation requested by Ruth (or Joe) would be violating
client voice.
While there is an illusion that the extra requirements might not
be according sufficient weight to client voice, there is an alternative
interpretation which suggests that adequate information, disclosure, and
consent maximize (empower) client voice. Only by ensuring that the
delegating spouse fully understands the implications of the delegation
can the client's voice be respected. The client needs to understand the
implications of her own voice before she can silence it.
On the other side of the paternalism observation, there is a fear
that the "substantially injure" standard is too low because it does not
provide adequate protection to the delegating spouse. Why not impose
a standard that requires the lawyer to warn the delegating spouse when
the delegated spouse takes actions that are not in the best interest of
the marital relationship?
We hope that spouses understand this to be their obligation to one
another. We are reluctant, however, to impose this as the level of
review that the lawyer must undertake. First, the law of husband and
wife does not require such a high standard of care between spous-
es. 12 7  Second, we want to accord some respect to the delegation
itself. Third, a lawyer's review of when a client fails to take actions in
the "best interest" of a marital entity will, necessarily, be arbitrary.
Determining the "best interests" is very difficult for judges; imposing
this level of review upon lawyers would probably force most lawyers
to walk away from the representation because of a well-grounded fear
of malpractice.
VI. CONCLUSION
We believe that one spouse can delegate decision-making
authority to another spouse in legal representation. We would,
however, impose requirements that respect both the delegation itself
and the underlying relationship. The primary requirement is one
common to both marital and commercial representation: a lawyer
representing multiple parties can do so only with the informed consent
of each client. Such informed consent would ensure that the spouses
understand the nature and extent of the delegation. We would also
impose additional requirements based on the recognition that marriage
involves special vulnerabilities and inequalities that do not characterize
127. See supra nn.86-87 (contrasting fiduciary duties for interspousal transactions in
community property states with the relative lack of standards in noncommunity property
jurisdictions).
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commercial relationships. First, we would place limits on the clients'
ability to define the lawyer's relationship with the nonspeaking spouse:
specifically, the nonspeaking client must be able to speak directly with
the lawyer and, if she so decides, withdraw the delegation. Second, we
would require that the lawyer revisit the delegation when an action
would "substantially injure" the nonspeaking spouse.
These protections take into account the differences between
representing a commercial entity and a family. By adapting the
standards set out in the Model Rules, these protections also protect the
lawyer from malpractice. And, finally, they serve to support depen-
dency and intimacy within marriage.
